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MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF SERVICES  






The purpose of this MBA project is to determine how the United States Army 
manages and oversees the acquisition of services.  To accomplish this objective, the 
authors deployed a survey to 81 separate contracting centers to collect empirical data.  
The survey, created by Meinshausen & Compton as part of a prior NPS MBA project, 
was designed to collect data on contract characteristics, life-cycle approach, project 
management, organization structure, and training provided to acquisition personnel. The 
survey was available for two full weeks in early March 2009.  During this period, 61 
respondents completed the survey, representing a 75% response rate.  The results show 
that the vast majority of contracting centers are using competitively bid, fixed-price 
contracts without any type of incentives.  This research also shows that a project team 
approach often is utilized; however, the contracting officer routinely leads the acquisition 
effort.  Additionally, the respondents indicated that there are not enough acquisition 
workforce billets, the current billets are not adequately filled, and that training resources 
are lacking.  The results of this project will be used for further research in a DoD wide 
analysis of lifecycle management of service acquisitions. 
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Since the early 1990s, the amount of money spent on Department of Defense 
(DoD) services contracts has skyrocketed as the amount of qualified personnel needed to 
manage and oversee these contracts has dwindled.  The DoD civilian workforce shrank 
by 38% between fiscal years 1989 and 2002 (GAO, 2006).  During this downsizing, 
obligations for services rose from $85.1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to over $151 
billion in FY 2006.  This was a 78% increase in constant FY 2006 dollars (GAO, 2007b).  
The DoD spends more than 50% of its procurement dollars on services compared with 
the amount spent on goods (GAO, 2005a).   
Reasons for the increased spending on services include the expansion of 
information technology services, professional/administrative support services in lieu of 
civilian workers, A-76 outsourcing, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  For 
example, the Army responded to competing security requirements at its installations 
following September 11, 2001 and the deployment of active and reserve personnel in 
support of GWOT, by awarding contracts worth almost $733 million for security guards 
at 57 installations (GAO, 2006).  As a result of the increased need for services and the 
reduction in the acquisition workforce, the management and monitoring of services 
















Contract Costs FY 2000
Contract Costs FY 2005
FY 2007 dollars in billions 
Figure 1.   Changes in Service Contract Costs in Selected Categories  
(From: GAO, 2007b) 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed 90 service contracts and 
found the surveillance to be “insufficient” on 26.  Of the 26, 15 had no assigned 
surveillance, and the 11 with assigned surveillance could not provide evidence of 
surveillance due to “incomplete documentation.”  GAO also found that the Army, unlike 
the Navy and Air Force, did not require surveillance personnel to be assigned prior to the 
awarding of the contract.  This was revised in April 2004, when the Army began 
requiring surveillance on a limited number of professional support service contracts, but 
this did not apply to contracts awarded before April 2004 that were still in effect (GAO, 
2005a).  GAO later outlined in a November 2006 report some keys to success for 
improving service acquisition management.  These included at the strategic level:  
(1) strong leadership that defines a corporate vision and normative goals; (2) sustained 
results-orientated communication and metrics; (3) defined responsibilities and associated 
support structures; and (4) increased knowledge and focus on spending and data trends. 
Keys to success at the transactional level included: (1) valid and well-defined 
requirements; (2) properly structured business arrangements; and (3) proactively-
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managed outcomes (GAO, 2006).  Ignoring these success factors and neglecting proper 
surveillance leaves the DoD exposed to “unnecessary risk, wastes resources, and 
complicates efforts to hold contractors accountable for poor service acquisition 
outcomes.”  This also will leave the DoD unable to identify and correct poor performance 
in a timely manner, in addition to paying too much for the services it receives (GAO, 
2007c). 
B. PURPOSE 
The objective of this research is to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
how the United States Army manages the acquisition of services.  To accomplish this 
objective, we conducted an analysis of empirical data collected from 63 contracting 
centers representing five major Army commands.  The data was collected through an 
Army version of a survey created by Compton and Meinshausen (Compton, 2007) for the 
Naval Postgraduate School in 2007.  Versions of this survey have been utilized by 
Miranda and McMaster in “An Empirical Study of the United States Navy’s Management 
and Oversight of Services Acquisition,” 2008 and by Solomon and Travieso in 
“Management and Oversight of Services Acquisition within the United States Air Force,” 
2008.  The results will be used for further research into managing the service supply 
chain in DoD (Apte and Rendon, 2007). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research attempts to answer the following questions as they relate to services 
acquisition within the United States Army: 
• What types of services typically are contracted for at Army installations 
and what is the annual expenditure for these services? 
• What types of acquisition strategies, procurement methods, and contracts 
are being used to acquire services? 
• How are these service contracts managed? 
• What type of organization/management structures are used to manage 
contracted services? 
• What training do contract and project/program management staff receive? 
(Apte, Ferrer, Lewis, and Rendon, 2006) 
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D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
In addition to providing a wide-ranging understanding of how services acquisition 
is managed within the United States Army, this research attempts to advance knowledge 
and provide recommendations on how the acquisition of services can be better managed 
at Army installations and across the DoD.  This research envelops the acquisition of 
services at Army installations in the Continental United States (CONUS).  The limitation 
of this research is that it only focuses on seven of the Product Service Code (PSC) 
categories.  These categories, as presented in Table 1, were selected because they 
represent the over 67% of all the services, excluding construction, purchased within 
Army in FY 2008 (FPDS, 2009).  The General Services Administration (GSA) defines 
the product service codes while the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) manages 
them for the DoD. 
Table 1.   Product Service Code Categories 
Service Category Classification Code
Professional, administrative, and management support R
Maintenance and repair of equipment J
Data processing and telecommunications D
Medical Q
Maintenance and Repair of Real Property Z
Utilities and housekeeping S
Transportation V  
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research utilizes a web-based survey entitled “DoD Military Installation 
Services Acquisition Survey: Army Installations” as a data-collection tool.  The survey is 
powered by SurveyMonkey.com, an online software tool that allows people to develop 
and deploy their own surveys.  The survey consists of 81 questions, including 12 Likert-
scale questions, each with six-item response ranges.  The self-administered surveys use 
filter questions and skip logic to move between service categories and other questions 
related to procurement methods. 
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The research for this report draws from three different sources: (1) government 
reports, memoranda, and documents, Naval Postgraduate School MBA Professional 
Reports, and Acquisition Research Sponsored Reports; (2) quantitative data from the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS); and (3) a web-based, self-administered survey 
on SurveyMonkey.  The results of the survey are analyzed in comparison with issues 
pertaining to contract surveillance as highlighted by the GAO.  Chapter IV will provide 
additional information on the survey. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This report is structured into five chapters.  Chapter I includes background 
information, purpose of the report, research questions, benefits and limitations, and the 
research methodology.  Chapter II reviews current literature related to services 
acquisition.  It examines several GAO reports, NPS research reports and DoD 
memorandums.  Chapter III examines the formation of Army Contracting Command, its 
mission, organizational structure, and the different services acquired by the command.  
Chapter IV examines the survey, selection of participants, the collected data, and its 
analysis.  Chapter V provides the answers to our research questions, recommendations to 
the Army Contracting Command, ways to improve the survey, and areas to consider for 
further research.   
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided background information on services acquisition within the 
DoD, the purpose of the report, research questions, benefits and limitations, and the 
research methodology.  The research questions are the primary focus of this research.  
The next chapter reviews available literature pertaining to services acquisition within 
DoD. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews available literature covering services acquisition.  The 
purpose of this review is to gain a better understanding of the services procurement 
processes, and related historical issues within the DoD and the United States Army.  This 
chapter begins by examining the management of service contracts.  Next, it looks at the 
contract management process and performance-based contracting.  Finally, this chapter 
will look at policies and training related to contractor surveillance and management.   
B. SERVICE CONTRACTS 
1. Service Contract Management 
DoD is the federal government’s largest purchaser of services (GAO 2005a) with 
obligations rising from $85.1 billion in FY 1996 to over $151 billion in FY 2006 (GAO 
2007b).  While these obligations continued to rise, the size of the acquisition workforce 
was downsized without “sufficient attention to requisite skills and competencies” needed 
to manage service contracts.  DoD continues to rely more and more on contractors to 
provide services despite “longstanding problems with contract management that continue 
to adversely impact services acquisition outcomes” (GAO 2007a). 
Those problems with services acquisitions outcomes, as outlined by the GAO, 
include: 
• Managing service acquisition within the DoD is reactive, largely 
fragmented, and uncoordinated with little visibility at the DoD or military 
department level 
• Inadequate management and assessment of contractor performance, none 
of which measures cost-effectiveness or quality of services obtained 
• Lack of competition 
• DoD information system data on amount spent on services is questionable 
and seldom used 
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• Procurement processes within DoD not carried out efficiently and 
effectively 
• Insufficient guidance, leadership, and contractor oversight personnel at 
deployed locations 
• DoD does not effectively leverage its buying power (GAO, 2006; GAO, 
2007a; GAO, 2007c). 
GAO suggests some ways to improve service acquisition, which is described as 
“obtaining the right service, at the right price in the right manner.”  This involves a 
strategic as well as a transactional focus.  As outlined previously, factors for success at 
the strategic level include: (1) strong leadership that defines a corporate vision and 
normative goals; (2) sustained results, orientated communication, and metrics; (3) defined 
responsibilities and associated support structures; and (4) increased knowledge and focus 
on spending and data trends.  At the transactional level, factors for success include:  
(1) valid and well-defined requirements; (2) properly-structured business arrangements; 
and (3) proactively-managed outcomes.  A comprehensive approach utilizes both 
strategic and transactional factors to complement one another to achieve desired 
outcomes (GAO 2006). 
To ensure these recommendations by GAO are followed; policies and practices 
are being put into place for effective service acquisition management.  The Under 
Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition Technologies and Logistics (AT&L) issued 
two memoranda in 2006 entitled “GAO High Risk Area: Contract Management” and 
“Acquisition of Services Policy.”  The first memorandum, written in February, made the 
reader aware that the USD for AT&L updated the DoD’s Improvement Plan dated 
August 12, 2005.  This plan incorporated implementation of section 812, which is the 
Management Structure for Procurement of Contract Services from the National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 2006, Public Law 109-163.  It required the establishment and 
implementation of a management structure for the acquisition of services.  The second 
memorandum released on October 2, 2006 outlined the most up-to-date policy  
implementation of section 812.  The intent of this policy was to strengthen the DoD 
management of the acquisition of services at the strategic and tactical level.  It will be 
included in the next revision of DoD 5000.2 (USD AT&L, 2006) 
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2. Performance-Based Services Acquisition 
The FAR states that PBSA is the preferred method for acquiring services in 
accordance with Public Law 106-398, section 821 (FAR37.102).  Performance-based 
contracts outline the desired result from the contractor while leaving the manner in which 
the work is performed up to the contractor.  “Simply put, it (PBSA) is a method for 
acquiring what is required and placing the responsibility for how it is accomplished on 
the contractor” (DoD, 2001).  Historically, the government has focused on “inputs rather 
than outcomes.”  PBSA shifts this focus to performance rather than the process.  It allows 
the contractor to be innovative and use industry best practices to meet the needs of the 
government.  According to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, performance-based 
contracts should: 
• Describe the requirements in terms of results required, rather than the 
methods of performance of the work 
• Set measurable performance standards 
• Describe how the contractor’s performance will be evaluated in a quality 
assurance plan 
• Identify positive and negative incentives, when appropriate (GAO 2002, 9, 
DoD 2001). 
The objectives of these parameters are to maximize performance through industry 
best practices, maximize competition and innovation instead of government-directed 
solutions, encourage and promote the use of commercial services as outlined by the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 (Acquisition of Commercial Items), shift 
risk from government to industry, and achieve savings (DoD, 2001).  As stated by the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD (AT&L)) on 
April 5, 2000, “It is the policy of the Department of Defense that in order to maximize 
performance, innovation and competition – often at a savings, performance-based 
strategies for the acquisition of services are to be used wherever possible.”  The Under 
Secretary set a goal in 2000 that 50% of all service acquisitions in dollars and actions 
should be performance-based by 2005 (DoD, 2001).  In 2001, performance-based 
contracts accounted for $28.6 billion or 21% of the $135.8 billion in total obligations, 
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while only 11% or 41,000 of 360,000 service contracts were actually performance-based 
acquisitions (GAO 2002a).  In 2002, GAO reviewed 25 contracts, 10 of which were in 
DoD to see if the different agencies had incorporated performance-based services 
acquisition and how well they using it. 
Of the 25 contracts reviewed by GAO, each had at least one performance-based 
attribute, while only nine displayed all four factors of performance-based contracts as 
outlined by the OFFP.  These contracts included one each for the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, two for the Treasury Department, and four by the GSA, including one for the 
Federal Technology Service and three for the Public Buildings Service.  These contracts, 
as described by the GAO, were for services performed “widely” in the commercial sector 
and that lend themselves easily to performance-based contracting because the 
measurements and specifics on the expected outcomes where “straightforward.”  
Four contracts were highlighted as good potential subjects for PBSA 
implementation. These included two by the Air Force for refuse collection and housing 
maintenance on an Air Force base and two by the Treasury Department for dormitory and 
food management at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.  The contracts would 
be able to utilize PBSA easily, but instead were too prescriptive in their contracts.  This 
did not allow the contractor to be innovative and find the most cost-effective way of 
providing the service. They did, however, incorporate positive or negative incentives into 
the contract, a key factor in PBSA.  
Finally, the other 12 contracts were described as more complex and risky, but 
with some attributes of PBSA.  These 12 contracts included one from the Army, four 
from the Navy, two from the Department of Energy (DoE), and five from the National 
Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA). These agencies found that because of 
the complexity involved with these services, such as a Navy tactical test range, launching  
and recovering the space shuttle and operating a nuclear facility, they needed to be more 
prescriptive in their contracts.  These contracts did include, however, incentives, quality 
assurance plans, and performance measures (GAO, 2002b). 
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These 25 contracts were opportunities for different agencies within the U.S. 
Government to implement PBSA.  Implementaion was successful in some cases and not 
in others.  Those agencies that did successfully implement PBSA—as well as those that 
did not—requested more guidance and training on the use of PBSA for service contracts, 
especially for the more complex acquisitions.  Also, better criteria need to be established 
for when to use a performance-based contract. (GAO, 2002b)  
3. Services Purchased within the DoD 
Four factors have contributed to an increase in DoD service contracts.  First, the 
Global War on Terrorism has called for increased use of personnel, including the reserves 
and civilian contractors. The second factor is the Office of Management and Budget’s 
(OMB) Circular A-76, which is the long-standing policy of the government to rely on 
civilians and the private sector for commercial services through competitive contracts.  
The third increase is due to DoD initiatives to outsource uniformed and DoD civilian 
jobs, and to privatize certain services.  Finally, the use of civilian contractors is favored 
by the DoD because it is easier to terminate or not renew a contract when a service is not 
needed, rather than laying off government employees.  To date, it is not clear if the 
increased use of contractors for services has caused the DoD higher costs.  This is 
because DoD does not know how much services would cost if done by government 
employees.  (GAO, 2007c)  DoD does, however, track data on the competitive 
outsourcing program known as A-76. 
Data from 538 of 570 A-76 decisions for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 
Force from 1995 through 2005 revealed that public/private competition decisions 
“generally resulted in reducing the government’s costs for the work.”  As seen in Figures 
2 and 3, the Army reported an estimated savings of about $33 million over 96 contracts.  
These 570 decisions to outsource represent just over 51% of the 1,112 jobs considered 
under A-76.  This replaced over 39,000 government employees who would have 





















Figure 2: 40 Army contracts resulting from public/ private competitions
Dollars in Millions
 
Figure 2.   Performance Period Results from Army A-76 Public/Private Competition 
Decisions to Outsource Work between Fiscal Years 1995 and 2005  
















Figure 3: 56 Army contracts resulting from direct conversion decisions
Dollars in Millions
 
Figure 3.   Performance Period Results from Army A-76 Public/Private Competition 
Decisions for Direct Conversions between Fiscal Years 1995 and 2005  
(From: GAO, 2007b) 
C. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
Six common phases for the procurement of services exist.  They are procurement 
planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and 
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contract closeout or termination.  Procurement planning involves outsource analysis, 
defining requirements, producing requirements documents such as work breakdown 
structures (WBS), performance work statements (PWS) and statements of work (SOW), 
market research, budget and cost estimates, determining contract type, and conducting 
risk analysis.  The solicitation-planning phase involves document preparation, which 
requires documenting requirements and identifying potential sources.  The solicitation 
phase focuses on gathering information in the form of bids and proposals from potential 
sellers.  The source selection phase involves negotiating with suppliers, applying the 
proposal evaluation criteria to select a supplier, and execute the contract award strategy.  
The contract administration phase involves ensuring that each party involved in the 
contract meets the terms and conditions of that contract.  The final phase of the contract 
management process is contract closeout or termination.  This phase consists of verifying 




Figure 4.   The Contract Management Process (buyer’s perspective)  
(From:  Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 164) 
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D. OVERSIGHT OF SERVICES CONTRACTS 
This research examines the management and oversight of services acquisition at 
Army installations worldwide.  Oversight otherwise known as surveillance is conducted 
during the contract administration phase of the contract.  As stated earlier, lack of 
surveillance on government services contracts puts the government at risk, wastes 
resources, and complicates efforts to hold contractors responsible for poor performance.  
One example of inadequate surveillance that cost the government money was the Army’s 
LOGCAP contract in Iraq.  The GAO reported that had the Army had adequate staffing, 
the Army could have saved substantially.  A Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) official responsible for oversight on the LOGCAP contract said he was unable 
to oversee contractor performance at all 27 locations in Iraq during his 6 months there. 
(GAO, 2007c)  Table 2 shows the DoD lacked adequate surveillance on 26 of 90 service 
















AFMC 20 39.00$       0 0
Other 8 2.40$         0 0
Army
ACA-North 19 86.20$       7 2
Other 11 20.70$       6 1
Navy
NAVSEA 20 226.60$     0 0
Other 6 8.70$         1 4
OSD and other DOD agencies 6 2.10$         1 4
Total 90 385.70$     15 11  




1. Contract Administration Policy 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) dictates all policies and procedures 
regarding the acquisition of services in the federal government.  It states that the 
contracting officer administering the contract will determine the extent of the 
surveillance. 
2. Surveillance Personnel  
Personnel assigned to conduct surveillance on service contracts are referred to by 
several different titles.  These titles include Quality Assurance Personnel (QAP), Quality 
Assurance Evaluator (QAE), Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR), Contracting 
Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR), and Task Order Manager (TOM).  These 
personnel typically are not considered part of the acquisition workforce but rather 
perform contract surveillance as an additional duty for the agency receiving the service.  
These surveillance personnel are assigned by the contracting officer based on what level 
of surveillance the contracting officer feels is required.  They usually are fulltime 
employees, and view the surveillance job as an additional duty.  Surveillance personnel 
also are not rated on the additional duties they are asked to perform. Often these 
employees do not have enough time in the normal workday, and have insufficient training 
to perform their surveillance duties.  (GAO, 2005a)  
Training is, however, required by the DoD for surveillance personnel.  CLC 106, 
“Contracting Officer Training with a Mission Focus” is available on line through the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU).  This course is described as an “overview” of 
basic concepts that will prepare a COR for surveillance duties (DAU, 2008).  The Army 
food service community and Quartermaster Corp have relied on civilian contractors for 
food service at CONUS and OCONUS installations for years.  Based upon this 
relationship, the Army Center of Excellence, Subsistence (ACES) offers an intense 5-day 
course covering the duties, responsibilities, and limitations of surveillance personnel.  
Emphasis is placed on contingency operations, concise requirements, legal parameters, 
sources and types of authority, property accountability, and performance assessment of 
contractors’ efforts.  This class is offered to all Warrant Officer Advanced and Basic 
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Classes, and to all Food Service Management students at Fort Lee, VA.  During FY 2006, 
this training was provided through 15 classes to over 425 students.  ACES also provide a 
Mobile Training Team for this training (ACES, 2008). 
Surveillance of service contracts is an important way to ensure that the contractor 
is providing the proper services to the government and preventing waste.  Continued 
training and improvement are needed throughout the DoD.  To improve contract 
surveillance in DoD, the GAO offered the following recommendations on contract 
surveillance in February 2005: 
• Ensure that the proper surveillance training of personnel, and their 
assignment to service contracts, occurs no later than the date of contract 
award 
• Develop practices to help ensure accountability for personnel carrying out 
surveillance responsibilities 
• Ensure that DoD’s service contract review process and associated data 
collection requirements provide information that will provide more 
management visibility over contract surveillance 
• Revise the October 2004 policy guidance on proper use of other agencies’ 
contracts to include guidance on conducting surveillance of service 
procured from other agencies’ contracts 
• That the Secretary of Defense directs the Secretary of the Army to assign 
surveillance personnel to conduct surveillance, as appropriate, on on-going 
Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) contracts awarded 
prior to 2004 (GAO 2005a). 
3. Current Issues 
Current issues that the DoD is facing regarding contract surveillance continue to 
be insufficient guidance, and leadership to manage contractors supporting deployed 
forces.  This was highlighted as one major issue by GAO.  In an attempt to remedy this, 
the DoD issued guidance in October, 2005 on contractor support to deployed forces. The 
guidance required that the department develop or designate a joint database for tracking 
contractors, their services, and capabilities.  In January 2007, DoD designated the Army’s 
Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as the lead database for 
improving visibility over deployed contractors.  SPOT includes approximately 50,000 
 17
contractor names, and was officially required for use by contractors in December 2006 by 
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (GAO 2007c). 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed available literature pertaining to services acquisition 
management, performance-based contracting, and oversight of service contracts.  There is 
no doubt services acquisition will continue to grow, despite a shrinking and stagnant 
civilian workforce needed to manage them.  These opposing events have led to waste, 
little to no surveillance of services contracts, inadequate documentation, and poorly 
trained personnel.  Performance-based contracting and its continued use are helping to 
correct the faults and make services acquisition within the DoD more effective and 
efficient.  The next chapter outlines the survey and its use in collecting empirical data on 
services acquisition in the United States Army. 
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III. ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the Army Contracting 
Command.  First, this chapter will describe the shortfalls in Army contracting that 
required the formation of a new contracting command.  It will then explain the Army 
Contracting Command’s mission and organizational structure. Finally, the chapter will 
provide an overview of how the offices and personnel within this command were selected 
to participate in this research project.     
B. NEED FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT 
The establishment of the Army Contracting Command was based on an urgent 
need for reform.  According to the Gansler Commission’s report, “the Army has a serious 
deficiency in contract and contract management personnel.”  This problem was cultivated 
over numerous years of workforce reductions, countered by the growth in both the 
number and complexity of acquisitions.  The Army’s contracting weaknesses became 
extremely apparent with the lack of trained and experienced Army contracting officers 
ready and available to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), and the numerous contracting scandals associated with these ongoing 
conflicts.  However, the attention created by the high-profile scandals had a positive 
affect by gaining the awareness and focus of the Army’s senior leadership on this critical 
capability.   
The first major contracting deficiency recognized by the Army was its insufficient 
number of trained and experienced contracting personnel.  This was caused by two 
diverging factors.  The first was the continual downsizing of acquisition personnel over 
much of the 1990s and early 2000s.  The second factor was the continual increase in the 
number and complexity of acquisitions and contracting actions.  Figure 5 clearly 
illustrates the results of these opposing factors. 
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Figure 5.   Defense Acquisition Spending and Workforce (From: Gansler, 2009) 
Numerous studies conducted throughout the 1990s determined that many services 
that were once accomplished by military personnel or Department of Defense civilian 
employees could be completed cheaper and more effectively by contractors.  The Army, 
as did the other military services, bought into this approach and underwent a dramatic 
reduction in the number of acquisition-related positions.    As a result, the Army reduced 
the number of trained and experienced contracting personnel, while the amount and 
number of contracting actions steadily increased.   
Another difficulty that the Gansler report identified was the Army’s shortage of 
fully trained and experienced contracting staff to support expeditionary operations.  This 
too was a result of the Army’s severely downsizing its acquisition forces.  In particular, 
this shortage was caused by the dramatic reduction in the number of active duty 
contracting officers.  According to the Gansler report, by the mid 2000s, only about 3% 
of all the Army contracting personnel were active duty military, and there were no Army 
contracting career general officers.  Even though the Army is the “Executive Agent” for 
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contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has had to rely heavily on the other 
services to fill mission-critical contracting billets in the Joint Contracting Command.  In 
fact, this command was led by an Air Force Major General, and approximately 67% of all 
the contracting billets were filled by Air Force contracting personnel (Commission on 
Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007).  Unlike 
many other functions that the Army is responsible for in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
contracting is not a function that can be contracted out to meet surges in demand.   
The other major deficiency the Army has encountered is a lack of coordination 
among contracting activities.  Prior to the establishment of the Army Contracting 
Command, the Army’s contracting resources were dispersed throughout numerous 
commands, and there was no direct authority over all of the contracting offices below the 
Secretary of the Army level (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007).  In addition to a dispersed workforce, 
there were no general officer positions available in the contracting career field.  These 
factors combined to create a complete lack of synchronization and advocacy to develop 
and lead the Army’s contracting personnel.   
For the reasons outlined above, it was evident that the Army needed to implement 
immediate changes to improve its contracting competence.  The Army fully recognized 
the importance of having a trained and experienced contracting workforce to support the 
growing number of acquisitions and to support the potential demand surge of 
expeditionary operations in the future.  To accomplish this, the Army required a major 
organizational realignment to manage its critical contracting resources and thus the Army 
Contracting Command was established.   
C. MISSION 
The primary function of the Army Contracting Command is summed up in its 
mission statement; “Provide global contracting support to warfighters through the full 




focal point within the Army for all of its contracting resources.  The command also has 
full authority and responsibility to continually improve the Army’s contracting 
capabilities. 
The establishment of the Army Contracting Command centralizes the 
management of the Army’s contracting resources.  This new structure promotes improved 
coordination and responsiveness, which leads to superior contracting support.  The 
realignment also creates a center of excellence in contract management, which will 
further enhance the level of service the command provides.  By combining contract 
experience in all aspects of acquisitions including installation level contracting and in 
weapon systems research and development, production, and sustainment and 
maintenance the Army Contracting Command will be able to support the contracting 
needs of any expeditionary operation, no matter how complex  (ACC, 2007). 
The Army Contracting Command also serves as a valuable advocate for the 
Army’s contracting workforce.  By serving as the primary sponsor for this vital career 
field, the command provides the resources required to hire, train, and continually develop 
highly competent contracting personnel.  This includes increasing the number of active 
duty contracting officers by providing an attractive and rewarding career path.  With the 
creation of the Army Contracting Command, the Army established two general officer 
billets in the contracting career field.  This now allows military officers who have 
ambitions of achieving the rank of general officer to choose contracting as a career path.  
Overall, the command provides a much-needed leadership function that will serve to 
expand, develop, and deliver world-class contracting support.   
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The Commander of the Army Contracting Command has the direct authority over 
most Army contracting capabilities, and serves as the focal point for status and readiness 
of the Army-wide contracting workforce (Anonymous, 2008).  This new organization 
was created by realigning the Army Contracting Agency from a field operating activity 
that fell under the leadership of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,  
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Logistics, and Technology to a major subordinate command of the Army Material 
Command.  This reorganization merges the majority of the Army’s contracting resources 
into a single command structure.   
Below the Commander of the Army Contracting Command there are two 
subordinate commands: an expeditionary contracting command, and an installation 
contracting command, both of which are led by a brigadier general.  In addition to the 
two subordinate commands, there are ten contracting centers that also fall under the 
control of the Army Contracting Command.  This organizational structure centralizes 
authority and serves to increase coordination and enhance the Army’s contracting 



























































Figure 6.   Army Contracting Command Organization (From: ACC,  2009) 
Although Figure 6 outlines the current structure of the Army Contracting 
Command, the command is still less than a year old and is continuing to evolve. In the 
end, the Army plans to hire an additional 1,400 new employees—400 soldiers and 1,000 
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civilians—to support contingency contracting operations (Hodge, 2007).  By the end of 
FY 2011, the command is projected to have a workforce totaling 753 military and 4,629 
civilians (ACC, 2009).  In addition to growing the workforce, the command is developing 
a competent and experienced contracting staff that will be able to provide a full-range of 
contracting services to meet the Army’s future requirements.    
E. SERVICES PROCURED 
Each of the installations and contracting centers that fall under the control of the 
Army Contracting Command is responsible for acquiring a unique set of goods and 
services.  Even though this research focuses on the seven service categories that DoD 
spends the most money on, individual organizations within the Army’s Contracting 
Command do not necessarily procure services from each of these categories.  For 
example, the Army spent approximately $896 million dollars on medical services in FY 
2008 (FPDS 2009), but the results of the present survey indicate that the majority of 
respondents do not contract for these services. 
The products and services that each contracting office procures obviously are 
based on the mission of the organization it supports.  Case in point, the U.S. Army’s Tank 
and Automotive Command (TACOM) contracting center provides lifecycle management 
for numerous weapon systems.  According to TACOM’s website, they are responsible for 
purchasing ground combat, tactical vehicles, small arms, chemical/biological systems, 
supporting services, repair parts, and the Future Combat Systems program.   
While the TACOM contracting center procures a wide variety of products and 
services related to the lifecycle management of weapon systems, the Mission and 
Installation Contracting Command procures items related to the operations and 
maintenance of installations.  Together, however, all of the organizations that make up 
the Army Contracting Command comprise the experience and knowledge to provide 
contracting expertise to meet any challenge.   
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F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a brief overview of why the Army Contracting Command 
was established, its mission, and how the command is organized.  The following chapter 
will provide a detailed analysis of the empirical data collected from the survey.     
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IV. SURVEY INSTRUMENT, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explains the participant selection, survey instrument, and examines 
the responses to the 81-question, web-based survey that focused on the management of 
services contracts throughout the Army.   The objective of this research was the 
collection of empirical data through the use of a survey.  A standardized 81-question 
survey, entitled DoD Military Installation Services Acquisition Survey-Army was 
deployed to 81 contracting offices.  The survey was distributed across 8 major 
contracting centers throughout the Army, including 40 Army installations.  The survey 
response rate was 75 %, or 61 responses.   
B. PARTICIPANT SELECTION 
The Participants for this survey were selected based on the organization they 
worked for, and their position within the organization.  The goal was to gather data from 
every organization within the Army Contracting Command that directly manages or 
oversees the contracting of services.  Once all of the organizations were identified, the 
individual personnel were selected based on their position within the organization.  The 
researchers sought to have senior contracting officers within the selected organizations 
complete the survey.  The purpose of this was to ensure the person completing the survey 
had a comprehensive view and understanding of how their organization managed service 
contracts. 
The only exception to the criteria above was the exclusion of the Expeditionary 
Contracting Command.  The researchers intentionally omitted the organization within 
this command from the survey for two primary reasons.  First, because of the uniqueness 
of contracting that takes place during contingency operations, the researchers felt the data 
provided by the Expeditionary Contracting Command would not accurately reflect, or 
correlate well with, contracting practices during peacetime operations.  Second, the  
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researchers did not want to add additional work to these personnel because of the 
environment and existing workload that Expeditionary Contracting Command is already 
experiencing.  
C. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
The survey was divided into four sections: administrative, core, general, and 
comments.  The administrative portion identifies branch of service and major command 
of the survey respondent. The remaining sections of the survey attempt to answer the 
research questions by assessing: (1) acquisition strategies, methods and contract types, 
(2) contract management, (3) project-team approach, and (4) the training acquisition staff 
receives. 
1. Focus of Core Questions 
The purpose of the core questions is to answer the following research questions: 
• What type of acquisition strategies, procurement methods, and contracts 
are being used to acquire services? 
• How are services contracts managed? 
• What types of organization/management structures are used to manage 
contracted services? 
Core questions were grouped by Product Service Codes (PSC), then by contract 
characteristics, acquisition management methods, project-team approach, and services 
acquisition leadership (Compton & Meinshausen 2007). 
2. Focus of General Acquisition Management Questions 
The purpose of these general questions was to answering the following research 
questions: 
• How are services contracts managed? 
• What types of organization/management structures are used to manage 
contracted services? 
• What training does contract and project/program management staff 
receive? 
 29
This section reviews the lifecycle approach and other acquisition management 
factors.  It also used a Likert scale to measures responses to 12 statements in levels of 
agreement of: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree, and not 
applicable.  The survey also offered an opportunity for participants to comment and to 
offer feedback on their concerns and recommendations for the survey and other 
acquisition topics. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Overview of Data Collected 
All 61 respondents were from the United States Army.  Out of the 61 respondents, 
33 were from MICC; 12 were from TACOM; 7 were from RDECOM; 5 were from NCR; 




Figure 7.   Response Distribution 
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2. Professional Administrative and Management Support 
Examination of the numbers associated with the professional, administrative, and 
management support product service code (PSC) R reveals that a competitive approach is 
used 70% to 88% of the time (FY03-08), while sole-source is used 6% to 9% of the time 
(FY 03-08).  Fixed-price contracts were used 59% to 70% of the time (FY03-08), while 
cost-type contracts were used 14% to 19% of the time (FY03-08).  Incentives or Award 
Fees were used only 19% to 27% of the time (FY03-08).  Professional, administrative 
and management services were acquired at the installation level 69% to 78% of the time 
(FY03-08).   
     
 
     
Figure 8.   Professional, Administrative & Management Support Services  
Core Question Re-cap 
The data shows that a project team approach was used 71 % of time.  Regardless 
of whether a project team approach was used in the acquisition of professional, 
administrative, and management support service, the contracting officer led the 
acquisition 76% of the time, while the customer owned the requirement 68% of the time. 
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Figure 9.   Professional, Administrative & Management Support Services  
Project Team Approach 
Is a Project-team Approach typically used in the acquisition 





Who, on-site (at your installation) leads the team in the 
acquisition? 
Who owns (generates and approves changes to) the 














3. Maintenance and Repair of Equipment 
The numbers associated with the maintenance and repair of equipment PSC J, 
show that a competitive approach was used 63% to 68% of the time (FY03-08), while 
sole-source was used 15% to 19% of the time (FY03-08).  Fixed-price contracts were 
used 60% to 71% of the time (FY03-08), while cost-type contracts were used 13% to 
16% of the time (FY03-08).  Incentives or Award Fees were used only 8% to 11% of the 
time (FY03-08).  Maintenance and Repair of Equipment services were acquired at the 
installation level 74% to 79% of the time (FY03-08).   
 
   
 
   
Figure 10.   Maintenance and Repair of Equipment Services Core Question Recap 
The data shows that a project team approach was used 66 % of time.  Regardless 
of whether a project team approach was used in the acquisition of maintenance and repair 
of equipment services, the contracting officer led the acquisition 68% of the time while 





Figure 11.   Maintenance and Repair of Equipment Services Project Team Approach 
Is a Project-team Approach typically used in the 





Who, on-site (at your installation) leads the team in 
the acquisition? 
Who owns (generates and approves changes to) the 















4. Data Processing and Telecommunications 
By examining the numbers associated with the Data Processing and 
Telecommunications PSC D, it is clear that a competitive approach is used 64% to 74% 
of the time (FY03-08), while sole-source is used 7% to 8% of the time (FY03-08).  
Fixed-price contracts were used 62% to 71% of the time (FY03-08), while cost-type 
contracts were used 5% to 8% of the time (FY03-08).  Incentives or Award Fees were 
used only 3% to 5% of the time (FY03-08).  Data Processing and Telecommunications 
services were acquired at the installation level 59% to 67% of the time (FY03-08).   
 
    
 
    
     
Figure 12.   Data Processing and Telecommunications Services Core Question Recap 
The data shows that a project team approach was used 66 % of time.  Regardless 
of whether a project team approach was used in the acquisition of data processing and 
telecommunications services, the contracting officer led the acquisition 63% of the time 
while the customer owned the requirement 76% of the time. 
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Figure 13.   Data Processing and Telecommunications Services Project Team Medical 
Is a Project-team Approach typically used in the 





Who, on-site (at your installation) leads the team in 
the acquisition? 
Who owns (generates and approves changes to) the 
















The numbers associated with the Medical Services PSC Q, show that a 
competitive approach was used 13% to 15% of the time (FY03-08), while sole-source 
was used 0% to 2% of the time (FY03-08).  Fixed-price contracts were used 13% to 16% 
of the time (FY03-08), while cost-type contracts were used 0% of the time (FY03-08).  
Incentives or Award Fees were used 0% of the time (FY03-08).  Medical services were 
acquired at the installation level 16% to 21% of the time (FY03-08).   
The high percentage of not applicable responses data can be linked to the fact that 
medical services are not procured through the Army contracting centers, but rather 
through procurement officers working for the U.S. Army Medical Department 
(AMEDD).  This is a service category that requires further research into how medical 
services are acquired.  This recommendation is included in the final chapter of our report.     
 
   
 
   
     
Figure 14.   Medical Services Core Question Recap 
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This survey shows that a project team approach was used only 23% of time.  
Regardless of whether a project team approach was used in the acquisition of medical 
services, the contracting officer led the acquisition only 25% of the time while the 
customer owned the requirement 90% of the time. 
 
Figure 15.   Medical Services Project Team Approach 
Is a Project-team Approach typically used in 





Who, on-site (at your installation) leads the 
team in the acquisition? 
Who owns (generates and approves changes 
















6. Maintenance and Repair of Real Property 
Examining the numbers associated with the Maintenance and Repair of Real 
Property PSC Z, it is evident that a competitive approach is used 66% to 71% of the time 
(FY03-08), while sole-source is used 3% to 7% of the time (FY03-08).  Fixed-price 
contracts were used 61% to 66% of the time (FY03-08), while cost-type contracts were 
used 8% to 12% of the time (FY03-08).  Incentives or Award Fees were used only 7% to 
10% of the time (FY03-08).   Maintenance and Repair of Real Property services were 
acquired at the installation level 72% to 77% of the time (FY03-08).   
 
   
 
   
     
Figure 16.   Maintenance and Repair of Real Property Services Core Question Recap 
After examining the results of the survey, the data shows that a project team 
approach was only used 61 % of time.  Regardless of whether a project team approach 
was used in the acquisition of maintenance and repair of real property services, the 
contracting officer led the acquisition 59% of the time while the customer owned the 





Figure 17.   Maintenance and Repair of Real Property Project Team Approach 
Is a Project-team Approach typically used in the 





Who, on-site (at your installation) leads the team in 
the acquisition? 
Who owns (generates and approves changes to) the 















7. Utilities and Housekeeping 
Examining the numbers associated with the utilities and housekeeping PSC S, 
shows that a competitive approach is used 44% to 51% of the time (FY03-08), while 
sole-source is used 16% to 21% of the time (FY03-08).  Fixed-price contracts were used 
59% to 62% of the time (FY03-08), while cost-type contracts were used 2% of the time 
(FY03-08).  Incentives or Award Fees were used only 3% of the time (FY03-08).   
Utilities and housekeeping services were acquired at the installation level 56% to 67% of 
the time (FY03-08).   
 
   
 
   
     
Figure 18.   Utilities and Housekeeping Services Core Question Recap 
After examining the results of the survey, the data shows that a project team 
approach was only used 61 % of time.  Regardless of whether a project team approach 
was used in the acquisition of utilities and housekeeping services, the contracting officer 





Figure 19.   Utilities and Housekeeping Project Team Approach 
Is a Project-team Approach typically used in the 
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8. Transportation and Travel 
Examining the numbers associated with the transportation and travel PSC V, 
shows that a competitive approach is used 41% to 46% of the time (FY03-08), while 
sole-source is only used 3% to 5% of the time (FY03-08) and N/A was selected 51% to 
54% of the time (FY03-08).  Fixed-price contracts were used 44% to 49% of the time 
(FY03-08), while cost-type contracts were used 0% of the time (FY03-08) and N/A was 
selected 51% to 56% of the time (FY03-08).  Incentives or Award Fees were used less 
than 1% of the time (FY03-08).  Transportation and Travel services were acquired at the 
installation level 44% to 51% of the time (FY03-08).   
 
   
 
   
     
Figure 20.   Transportation and Travel Core Question Recap 
After examining the results of the survey, the data shows that a project team 
approach was only used 49% of the time.  Regardless of whether a project team approach 
was used in the acquisition of transportation and travel services, the contracting officer 





Figure 21.   Transportation and Travel Project Team Approach 
Is a Project-team Approach typically used in the 
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9. General Survey Questions 
The final portion of this survey covered general questions concerning the 
acquisition of services at the installation level throughout the Army.  According to the 
results, the contracting officer writes and awards contracts for services 59% of the time.  
When asked who was responsible for surveillance at the installation, the results showed 
that there was little consistency among the respondents with none of the choices selected 
more than 30% of the time.  Results for training showed that 57% of the respondents had 
received Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certified training, 
while only 7% of staff members had QAS Phase II training.  Results for the question 
regarding COR/QAE length of service in their position showed that 87% of QAE/CORs 
have over a year in their current position, while the remaining 13% had between 6 to 12 
months in their position 
    
 
   
 
Figure 22.   General Survey Questions 
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10. Likert Scale Questions 
After conducting an analysis of the 12 Likert Scale statements, several issues 
were identified.  Responses indicated that the number of authorized acquisition staffing 
positions within the Army were insufficient as well as inadequately filled. Respondents 
also indicated that adequate oversight was not afforded to monitor contractor 
performance. Lastly, the survey indicates that QAEs submitted contractor surveillance 
reports approximately 50% of the time.   
The first two Likert Scale statements dealt with the use of a life-cycle approach 
for the acquisition of routine and non-routine services.  A lifecycle approach was used by 
respondents 40% of the time for the acquisition of routine services.  For non-routine 
services, a lifecycle approach was used by respondents only 21% of the time.   
 
  
Figure 23.   Lifecycle approach for routine services 
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Figure 24.   Lifecycle approach for non-routine services 
The next Likert Scale statement dealt with assignment length for QAE/CORs.  
Asked if CORs/QAEs at their installation serve in short-term assignments of 18 months 
or less, 44% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Short Term Assignments 
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The fourth Likert Scale statement dealt with whether or not market research was 
conducted at respondents’ installations.  Respondents either agreed or strongly agreed 
that market research was being conducted 82% of the time.  Just nine respondents either 
strongly disagreed or disagreed. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Market Research Conducted 
The next two Likert statements examined manning issues on the respondents’ 
installations.  The first statement asked if there were enough authorized positions within 
their organizations to complete their missions.  The second statement asked if those 
positions the respondents were authorized, were adequately filled.  The survey showed 
that 77% of respondents felt their organization had insufficient services acquisition staff 
positions, while 65% of respondents thought their authorized staff positions were 
inadequately manned.  As discussed in Chapter II, the amount of services contracts for 




Figure 27.   Adequate Staffing 
 
Figure 28.   Positions Adequately Filled 
The next two Likert scale statements focus on the training and qualifications of 
the acquisition workforce.  The first statement examines if acquisition staff members 
were adequately trained.  The second statement asks if acquisition staff members were 
adequately qualified.  Just 39% of respondents agreed that the acquisition workforce were 




Figure 29.   Staff Training Received 
 
Figure 30.   Staff Qualifications 
The next Likert scale statement dealt with customer responsibilities.  The 
statement asked if the customer was writing the Statements of Work (SOW) or 
Statements of Objective (SOO) for services contracts.  Respondents agreed 83% of the 
time that the customer who identified a service requirement was generating the necessary 
documents.  Just five respondents disagreed. 
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Figure 31.   Identifying Requirement/Writing SOW 
The next two Likert scale statements dealt with QAE training and reporting.  
Respondents agreed 67% of the time that QAEs received formal or documented training 
prior to assuming duties as a QAE.  One such duty is submitting written reports regarding 
the performance/quality of work of contractors to the regional contracting officer or 
office for each service contract.  Respondents agreed this happened only 37% of the time. 
 
 
Figure 32.   Surveillance Training Received as QAE 
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Figure 33.   QAE Reporting 
The final Likert scale statement dealt with the oversight afforded to monitor 
contractor performance on services contracts.  Respondents felt proper oversight was 
occurring just 23% of the time. 
 
 
Figure 34.   Level of Oversight 
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E. SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 
The cumulative results of our research on contract characteristics are displayed in 
Table 3.  The data shows that the Army is using competitively bid contracts and fixed-
price contracts a majority of the time, and that the frequency of these type contracts has 
continually increased over the past six years.  The results also show that contract 
incentives are rarely utilized. 
Table 3.   Contract Characteristics Summary 
Competitive
Sole 







FY03 58% 10% 32% 58% 8% 34% 0% 6% 2% 92%
FY04 59% 10% 31% 60% 7% 33% 0% 5% 1% 93%
FY05 59% 10% 30% 60% 7% 33% 1% 5% 1% 93%
FY06 62% 10% 28% 63% 8% 29% 1% 5% 2% 92%
FY07 65% 10% 25% 65% 8% 27% 1% 6% 2% 91%
FY08 66% 10% 24% 66% 8% 26% 1% 6% 2% 91%
Degree of Competition Contract Type Contract Incentive
*Medical services are not included in the table above. 
The cumulative results of the research on contracting organization level are 
displayed in Table 4.  The data shows that the majority of the work throughout each 
acquisition phase was conducted at the installation level.  This gives the contracting 
officer a better understanding of the customers’ needs and therefore allows them to 
provide more efficient and effective services.    
Table 4.   Contracting Organization Level Summary 
Regional Installation N/A
Acquisition Planning 11% 67% 22%
Solicitation 12% 66% 22%
Source Selection 11% 62% 27%




The cumulative results of the research on the utilization of a project team 
approach are displayed in Table 5.  The data shows that a project team approach was used 
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62% of the time.  However, regardless of whether a project team approach was used, 61% 
of the respondents said that the contracting officer leads the team.  The table also shows 
that the customer owns the requirement, regardless of whether or not a project team 
approach was used, 75% of the time.   















Organizations Using Project Team Approach 











61 23 11 12 5 18
Organizations Not Using Project Team Approach




F.  SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the results of the survey and shows the current state of 
acquisition management of services contracting throughout the Army.  This chapter 
focused on the responses to our 81-question, web-based survey.  The survey had 61 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides answers to the research questions, recommendations to the 
Army Contracting Command, ways to improve the survey and areas to consider for 
further research.   
B.   CONCLUSIONS  
1. Service Types and Annual Expenditures 
To answer the first research question, what types of services are typically 
contracted for at Army installations and what is the annual expenditure for these 
services, the FPDS database was used to analyze how much the Army spends annually on 
all of the various service categories.  This database was used to pull up the most recent 
data, which was the FY 2008 data.  Table 6 shows that the Army spent over $40 billion 
on the seven service categories listed.  This represents over 67% of the dollars the Army 
spent on all services, not including construction costs, in FY 2008. 
Table 6.   Army Expenditures by PSC for FY2008 (FPDS, 2009) 
PSC Category (Description) FY08$M
R - Professional, admin, & mngt support $23,914
Z- Maintenance & repair of real property $4,631
J - Maintenance & repair of equipment $3,994
D-  Data processing and telecom $3,116
S - Utilities & housekeeping $3,071
Q - Medical $896
V - Transportation $446  
2.   Types of Acquisition Strategies, Procurement Methods, and Contracts 
To answer the second research question, what type of acquisition strategies, 
procurement methods, and contracts are being used to acquire services, responses from 
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the survey questions that pertained to the dominant contract characteristics and the 
dominant services acquisition management methods were analyzed.  The results show 
that the acquisition management phases (acquisition planning, solicitation, source 
selection, and contract administration) are conducted at the installation level over 60% of 
the time.  The data also shows that the majority of contracts are competitively bid, fixed 
priced, and rarely include incentives.  This holds true for all service categories except for 
medical.  Most respondents did not have experience contracting for medical services, 
which lead to an overwhelming number of not applicable responses.     
3.   Management of Service Contracts  
To answer the third research question, how are these service contracts managed, 
the questions regarding acquisition services management and services acquisition 
leadership and staffing were analyzed.  The data shows that a lifecycle approach is used 
more often for the acquisition of routine services than it is for the acquisition non-routine 
services.  Lifecycle approach is used approximately 40%  of the time for the acquisition 
of routine services, versus only 21%  of the time when acquiring non-routine services.  In 
addition, the respondents overwhelmingly disagreed that their organization had sufficient 
acquisition positions, and also disagreed that those positions were adequately filled.  This 
data supports the GAO reports that as the acquisition of services increases on an annual 
basis, the acquisition workforce is not adequately manned to meet this growing demand.   
4.   Organization/Management Structures Used to Manage Services 
To answer the fourth research question, what type of organization/management 
structures are used to manage contracted services the questions regarding services 
acquisition management methods and services acquisition leadership, were analyzed.  
The survey results show that the acquisition management phases (acquisition planning, 
solicitation, source selection, and contract administration) are conducted at the 
installation level over 60% of the time.  The data also shows that 62% of the respondents’ 
organizations utilize a project team approach; however, 68% of the respondents said that 
the contracting officer leads the team.  In addition to leading the acquisition team, the 
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contracting officer writes and awards the contract.  While the contracting officer often 
leads the acquisition team, the data shows that the customers generates the requirement 
through writing the statement of work (SOW) approximately 83%  of the time.    
5.   Project/Program Management Staff Training   
To answer the final research question, what training does contract and 
project/program management staff receive, the survey questions concerning services 
acquisition management methods and services acquisition leadership were examined.  
The data from these questions indicate services acquisition members are inadequately 
trained.  Only 39 respondents agreed that the acquisition workforce was adequately 
trained, while just 45% of the respondent agreed the workforce was adequately qualified.  
Although a large percentage of the respondents did not agree that the workforce was 
adequately qualified, the results show that contracting personnel are receiving training of 
some sort.  There were numerous comments provided for the question regarding the type 
of training received.  These comments included a range of answers from “none, learn by 
doing” to “whatever is offered on-line.”  Additionally, QAEs are receiving formal 
documented training 67% of the time, although they are only submitting required written 
reports on contractor performance 47%  of the time. 
C.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendations to the Army Contracting Command 
To improve the management of services acquisition, the first recommendation is 
to increase the effectiveness and availability of training to ensure a qualified acquisition 
workforce.  Based on the results from the research, respondents indicated that only 39% 
agreed that the acquisition workforce was adequately trained.  In addition, only 45% of 
respondents agreed that acquisition staff members were adequately qualified.  
Respondents also provided numerous negative comments regarding the poor quality and 
the lack of training.     
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Another recommendation to improve the overall management of services 
acquisition is to increase the size of the acquisition workforce, reversing the downsizing 
trend that began in the 1990s.  The results of this research, as indicated in Figure 34, 
show that the number of CORs/QAEs also needs to be increased.  Respondents agreed 
that proper oversight was occurring just 23% of the time.  Increasing the size of the 
workforce will allow for better oversight, and help ensure that contractor performance is 
properly monitored.   
Another recommendation is to maintain the positive trend of increasing the 
number of competitively bid, fixed-price contracts as depicted in Table 2.  These types of 
contracts promote competition, which ensures the Government gets the right services at 
the best value.  Fixed-price contracts shift the risk of cost overruns away from the 
Government and onto the contractor.  This also serves to incentivize the contractor to 
complete tasks within budget.   
2.   Survey Improvement 
The first recommendation to improve the survey is to reduce the ambiguity of all 
“not applicable” answers.  Require respondents to add a comment for their “not 
applicable” answers to clarify why they selected that choice.  This would provide 
researchers with additional information into why the question does not apply to the 
respondents’ organizations.  Adding this additional requirement will also help to identify 
trends and future areas for research.  
The second recommendation is to add additional choices for “contract type” 
question.  The survey only had options for fixed-price contracts, cost-type contracts, and 
not applicable.  Adding additional choices, such as indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity 
contracts, requirements contracts, time-and-material contracts, and labor-hour contracts, 
would eliminate some of the not applicable responses and serve to improve the data by 
providing more specific results.   
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The final way to improve the survey is to correct the last question by allowing 
respondents to select all choices that apply.  The final question asks whether or not 
respondents would like a copy of the survey results or the project report.  This question 
currently only allows the respondent to select one choice. 
3.   Areas for Further Research 
Additional research should be conducted on contracting for medical services.  
During the course of this research, the researchers discovered that medical services are 
procured by a medical procurement officer, and not a member of the Army Contracting 
Center.  Further research should include who procures these services, how are they 
procured, and how does this compare to the service categories procured by the Army.   
The researchers also recommend that this survey be deployed to units currently 
deployed to the CENTCOM area of responsibility.  By collecting this data, comparisons 
can be made to between contracting practices of deployed and non-deployed units.  The 
survey should also be utilized by other DoD agencies that contract for services such as 
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